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Addressing	 the	 laundering	of	money	 is	a	key	policing	and	policy	priority,	domestically	and	
internationally.	 The	 European	 Union’s	 Fourth	 Anti-Money	 Laundering	 Directive	 was	
transposed	 into	 domestic	 law	 in	 the	 UK	 in	 June	 2017,	 through	 the	 Money	 Laundering,	
Terrorist	Financing	and	Transfer	of	Funds	(Information	on	the	Payer)	Regulations	2017.	This	
article	 is	 a	 socio-legal	 critique	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 changes	 brought	 about	 by	 these	
Regulations.	 It	 synthesises	 and	 analyses	 a	 number	 of	 dimensions	 of	 the	 Regulations,	
structured	around	 the	central	 themes	of	 risk	and	 transparency.	By	 framing	 the	critique	 in	
this	way,	this	article	not	only	challenges	conventional	views	as	to	the	necessity	and	benefits	






Addressing	 the	 laundering	 of	 money	 has	 been	 a	 key	 policing	 and	 policy	 priority	 at	 the	
domestic	 and	 international	 level	 for	 decades.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 a	 global	 anti-money	
laundering	 (AML)	 regime	 has	 been	 developed,	 incorporating	 what	 is	 now	 an	 extensive	
compliance	industry,	in	an	effort	to	preserve	the	integrity	and	stability	of	the	economy	from	


























There	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 concerning	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 money	 laundering,	
rendering	it	difficult	to	study	and	to	assess	its	scale.	Legally	the	term	encompasses	not	only	
the	 orthodox	 understanding	 of	 the	 “cleaning”	 of	 assets,	 but	 also	 their	 concealment,	
conversion,	 transfer	 and	 removal.8	 Despite,	 or	 perhaps	 because	 of,	 these	 definitional	
ambiguities,	 it	 is	 fair	 to	 say	 that	money	 laundering	 has	 become	 “one	 of	 the	 great	moral	
panics	of	our	day”9,	and	that	there	is	a	“crusade”	against	it.10	This	campaign	has	taken	the	
form	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 complex	 framework	 of	 AML	 laws	 and	 policies,	 as	 well	 as	
uniformly	 supportive	political	 rhetoric.	 The	 scheme	comprises	a	 range	of	 (trans/)	national	






Force	 (FATF),	 an	 inter-governmental,	 policy-making	body	 established	 in	 1989,13	which	 are	
echoed	 in	 a	 series	 of	 Anti-Money	 Laundering	 Directives	 from	 the	 European	 Union,	
ultimately	transposed	through	domestic	legislation.		
	
The	 Regulations	 are	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 AML	 regulatory	 landscape	 in	 the	 UK,	 which,	 as	 is	
explored	below,	relies	heavily	on	private	actors,	and	includes	the	creation	of	bodies	like	the	
Joint	 Money	 Laundering	 Steering	 Group	 (JMLSG)	 and	 the	 Joint	 Money	 Laundering	
Intelligence	 Taskforce	 (JMLIT).	 JMLSG	 comprises	 trade	 associations	 from	 the	 financial	
services	 industry	specifically,	and	it	 issues	guidance	which	is	taken	into	account	by	a	court	
when	considering	whether	a	person	 in	 the	 sector	has	 committed	 the	offence	of	 failing	 to	
report	money	 laundering.14	Moreover,	 in	2014	 the	National	Crime	Agency	established	 the	
Joint	 Money	 Laundering	 Intelligence	 Taskforce	 (JMLIT)	 in	 partnership	 with	 the	 financial	
















13	 International	 Standards	 on	 Combating	Money	 Laundering	 and	 the	 Financing	 of	 Terrorism	&	 Proliferation	
(FATF	Recommendations),	published		in	February	2012:	http://www.fatf-gafi.org.	The	FATF	Recommendations	








changes	brought	 about	by	 the	Money	 Laundering	Regulations	2017	 (MLR	2017)	 and	 their	
interplay	with	existing	 law.	 This	 article	 is	 significant	 in	 that	what	 commentary	 there	 is	 on	
4AMLD	and	the	MLR	2017	is	strictly	doctrinal	 in	focus.	Though	that	 is	useful	 in	a	technical	
and	practical	sense,	here	I	offer	further	conceptual	exploration	and	normative	conclusions.	
This	 article	 synthesises	 and	 subsequently	 analyses	 a	 number	 of	 dimensions	 of	 the	 MLR	
2017,	 structured	 around	 the	 central	 themes	 of	 risk	 and	 transparency.15	 By	 framing	 the	
critique	in	this	way,	this	article	not	only	challenges	conventional	views	as	to	the	benefits	and	
necessity	of	AML	but	also	provides	scholars	and	policymakers	with	specific	analyses	which	
assist	 in	whether	 the	 existing	 nature	 and	 form	 of	 AML	measures	 can	 be	 justified.	 This	 is	








assessment;	 and	 the	 requirements	 of	 due	 diligence.	 I	 consider	 how	 private	 entities	 are	
circumventing	and	confounding	the	risk-based	approach,	and	reflect	on	the	implications	of	
this.	 In	 addition,	 to	 improve	 transparency,	 4AMLD	 requires	 the	 establishment	 of	 two	
registers,	 one	 for	 corporate	 bodies,	 the	 other	 for	 trusts.	 	 I	 assess	 how	 these	 have	 been	








Directives	 must	 be	 transposed	 into	 the	 domestic	 law	 of	 all	 member	 states.	 The	 latest	
Directive,	the	Fourth	Anti-Money	Laundering	Directive	2015/849	(4AMLD),	was	adopted	by	
the	European	Parliament	on	20	May	2015,	and	reflects	the	revised	FATF	recommendations	














Europe	as	well	as	 the	“Panama	Papers”,17	and	seeks	 to	 take	 into	account	new	means	and	
modalities	 of	 transferring	 funds.	 So,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 AML	 terrain	 is	 shifting,	 and	
expanding.		
	
Notwithstanding	the	vote	 to	 leave	the	European	Union	 in	 June	2016	and	the	triggering	of	
Article	50	in	Match	2017,	for	the	time	being	the	UK	remains	a	full	member	and	will	continue	




October	 2018;	 the	 last	 evaluation	 was	 in	 2007	 where	 after	 follow-up	 action	 the	 UK	 was	








force	 on	 26	 June	 2017.	 Like	 their	 precursors,	 the	 2017	 Regulations	 implement	 the	 main	
preventative	 measures	 of	 the	 relevant	 EU	 Directive,	 by	 requiring	 “obliged	 entities”19	 or	
“relevant	 persons”20	 in	 the	 financial	 sector	 and	 beyond	 to	 apply	 customer	 due	 diligence	
measures	and	take	other	steps	to	prevent	their	services	being	used	for	money	laundering.	
	
There	 is	 a	 deliberate	 degree	 of	 latitude	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 legislative	 transposition	 of	
4AMLD	as	well	as	the	practical	implementation	of	the	MLR	2017.	As	is	outlined	below,	while	
some	articles	in	4AMLD	are	mandatory,	others	leave	discretion	to	member	states	as	to	how	
they	 will	 enact	 the	 measures,	 in	 permitting	 the	 exemption	 of	 certain	 sectors	 from	 AML	
obligations,	for	instance.	Moreover,	both	4AMLD	and	the	Regulations	generally	are	framed	
in	 terms	 of	 objectives,	with	 little	 to	 no	 prescription	 or	 elaboration	 as	 to	 how	 these	 aims	
must	 be	 met	 by	 the	 particular	 entity.	 This	 guarantees	 some	 discretion	 for	 businesses	 in	


















The	 system	 of	 money	 laundering	 controls	 has	 been	 criticised	 for	 “weak	 conceptual	
foundations”.22	Regardless,	a	lack	of	foundational	principles	has	not	stymied	its	continuance	






4AMLD,	 like	 its	 predecessor,	 imposes	 obligations	 on	 certain	 business	 entities	 to	 establish	
policies	and	procedures	to	prevent	money	laundering.	The	current	regime	is	predicated	on	
the	management	of	the	risk,	through	its	ascertainment	by	means	of	risk	assessments,	and	
then	 the	 subsequent	 shaping	 of	 the	 required	 customer	 due	 diligence	 measures.23	 A	
“relevant	 person”,	 as	 explored	 below,	 must	 establish	 adequate	 and	 appropriate	 policies,	
controls	and	procedures	 to	prevent	money	 laundering,24	proportionate	with	regard	to	the	
size	 and	nature	of	 its	 business.25	 It	must	 “regularly	 review	and	update”	 such	policies	 and	
controls,	 and	maintain	 a	written	 record	 of	 any	 changes	made	 following	 review	 and	 steps	
taken	to	communicate	the	changes	to	staff.26	Failure	to	comply	with	these	obligations	risks	a	
prison	 term	 of	 up	 to	 two	 years	 and/or	 a	 fine,27	 and	 individual	 and	 corporate	 liability	 is	
provided	for.28	
	
Under	 the	 separate,	 pre-existing	 legal	 framework,	 entities	 must	 identify	 and	 report	
suspicious	 transactions	 to	 the	United	 Kingdom	 Financial	 Intelligence	Unit,	 in	 the	National	
Crime	 Agency,	 by	 means	 of	 “suspicious	 activity	 reports”	 (SARs).29	 Peter	 Alldridge’s	
observation	 that	 these	policies	 induce	 “defensive	over-reporting”30	 holds	 true,	 and	 this	 is	
exacerbated	 by	 the	 increased	 obligations	 and	 reporting	 requirements	 under	 4AMLD.	 The	
danger	of	 imposing	criminal	sanctions	 in	this	context	 is	over-recording	and	over-reporting,	
























the	 private	 sector	 as	 one	 of	 its	 Action	 Plan’s	 four	 priorities.34	 The	 range	 of	 entities	 and	
sectors	encompassed	by	AML	requirements	has	been	steadily	expanding	from	the	financial	
sector	 only,	 as	 was	 the	 situation	 under	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 first	 AML	 Council	 Directive	 of	
1991.35	 Now	 “obliged	 entities”	 or	 “relevant	 persons”	 are	 defined	 as	 credit	 and	 financial	
institutions;	 auditors,	 external	 accountants	 and	 tax	 advisors;	 notaries	 and	 other	
independent	 legal	 professionals,	 trust	 or	 company	 services	 providers;	 estate	 agents;	




value	 goods	 has	 been	 lowered,	 down	 from	 EUR15,000	 in	 3AMLD.37	 Moreover,	 4AMLD	
extends	its	coverage	to	the	whole	gambling	sector,	offline	and	online,	whereas	only	holders	
of	 a	 casino	 operating	 licence	were	 subject	 previously.	 Though	 prima	 facie	 4AMLD	would	
apply	 to	 the	 entire	 gambling	 industry,	 it	 permits	 the	 exemption	 of	 providers	 of	 certain	
gambling	 services	 on	 the	 “basis	 of	 the	 proven	 low	 risk	 posed	 by	 the	 nature	 and,	 where	
appropriate,	the	scale	of	operations	of	such	services”.38	A	decision	has	been	taken	in	the	UK	
to	so	exempt	the	gambling	industry,39	apart	from	casinos,	thus	representing	a	maintenance	
of	 the	 status	 quo.	 This	 position	 will	 be	 kept	 under	 review,40	 and	 will	 form	 part	 of	 HM	


































for	 which	 they	 were	 acting,	 usually	 the	 seller.	 Now	 an	 estate	 agent	 is	 to	 be	 treated	 as	
entering	into	a	business	relationship	with	a	purchaser	(as	well	as	with	a	seller),	at	the	point	
when	the	purchaser’s	offer	 is	accepted	by	the	seller.45	Moreover,	the	meaning	of	business	
relationship	 has	 been	 extended	 to	 include	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 company	 by	 a	 trust	 or	




Relevant	 persons	 are	 gatekeepers-turned-police,	 required	 to	 detect,	 monitor	 and	 report	
suspicions	of	money	 laundering,	but	are	 viewed	also	as	possible	 facilitators	or	enablers,48	
that	can	be	deterred	or	punished	through	criminalisation.	In	terms	of	their	policing	role,	on	
the	 one	 hand	 this	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	 quintessential	 “responsibilisation”	 of	 private	
entities	in	the	policing	of	problematic	behaviour.49	This	involves	the	redefinition	of	the	role	
of	 the	state	 to	one	of	a	partner	or	 facilitator,	 “steering	and	regulating	 rather	 than	rowing	





































terrorist	 financing	 affecting	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 and	 must	 keep	 this	 updated.54	 The	
assessment	must,	 inter	alia,	 identify	 in	what	context	and	what	sort	of	enhanced	customer	
due	 diligence	measures	 should	 be	 applied;	 sectors	 or	 areas	 of	 lower	 and	 greater	 risk	 of	




international	and	domestic	 risks	of	money	 laundering	 to	which	 those	relevant	persons	 for	
which	it	is	the	supervisory	authority	are	subject.55	Each	supervisory	authority	must	keep	an	








Regulation	 18	 governs	 the	 assessment	 of	 risk	 by	 “relevant	 persons”,	 requiring	 credit	
institutions;	 financial	 institutions;	 auditors,	 insolvency	 practitioners,	 external	 accountants	
and	 tax	 advisers;	 independent	 legal	 professionals;	 trust	 or	 company	 service	 providers;	
estate	agents;	high	value	dealers	and	casinos	to	carry	out	business	risk	assessments.	They	
must	identify	and	assess	the	risks	of	money	laundering	and	terrorist	financing	to	which	their	
business	 is	 subject,	 taking	 into	 account	 information	 made	 available	 to	 them	 by	 their	
supervisory	authority,	and	risk	 factors	relating	to	their	customers,	countries	or	geographic	
areas	of	operations,	products,	services,	transactions	and	delivery	channels.	A	business	must	





categorised.	There	 is	no	calculation	of	 risk	 factors	based	on	an	equation	 like	probability	 x	
severity	 x	 detectability,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 in	 risk	 assessment	 in	 other	 sectors	 such	 as	 the	



















no	 explanation	 or	 quantification	 of	 these.	 Rather	 it	 is	 left	 to	 supervisory	 authorities	 and	
relevant	persons	to	devise	the	standards	and	guidance.	The	only	reference	to	“medium	risk”	
is	to	be	found	in	Schedule	4	of	the	MLR	2017.64	A	relative	approach	to	risk	is	evident	in	the	




than/according	 to	what?”	The	 term	“reduced	 risk”	 is	not	adopted	 in	 the	Regulations,	and	





The	 persons	 outlined	 above	 must	 apply	 different	 levels	 of	 due	 diligence	 measures	 to	
customers,	depending	the	nature	and	level	of	risk:	customer	due	diligence	(CDD),	simplified	
due	diligence	(SDD)	or	enhanced	due	diligence	(EDD).	The	rationale	is	that	this	process	will	
act	 as	 a	 deterrence	 to	 offending,	 and	 will	 deny	 offenders’	 access	 to	 financial	 and	 other	




Relevant	 persons	must	 carry	 out	 CDD	where	 there	 is	 a	 suspicion	 of	money	 laundering	 or	
terrorist	financing,	and	in	the	case	of	trading	in	goods	with	cash	transactions	of	EUR	15,000	
or	more,	or	EUR	10,000	for	high-value	dealers.69	CDD	means	 identifying	the	customer	and	
verifying	her	 identity	on	the	basis	of	 reliable	 information;	 identifying	 the	beneficial	owner	
and	taking	reasonable	measures	to	verify	that	person’s	identity	so	that	the	relevant	person	
is	satisfied	that	it	knows	who	the	beneficial	owner	is,	including	taking	reasonable	measures	
to	 understand	 the	 ownership	 and	 control	 structure	 of	 legal	 persons,	 trusts,	 companies,	
foundations	 and	 similar	 legal	 arrangements;	 obtaining	 information	 on	 the	 purpose	 and	















Where	 a	 Member	 State	 or	 relevant	 person	 identifies	 “areas	 of	 lower	 risk”	 simplified	
customer	due	diligence	measures	may	be	applied.71	That	said,	the	simplified	customer	due	
diligence	(SDD)	process	has	been	amended	to	move	away	from	its	automatic	deployment,	
resulting	 in	 an	 increased	 onus	 on	 the	 relevant	 person.	 Now,	 SDD	 is	 allowed	 where	 the	
relevant	 person	 has	 established	 that	 the	 business	 relationship	 or	 transaction	 presents	 a	
lower	degree	of	money	laundering	risk,	taking	into	account	the	risk	assessment,	information	
from	the	sector’s	supervisory	authority,	and	risk	factors	relating	to	the	customer,	product,	
service,	 transaction,	 delivery	 channel	 or	 geographical	 location.72	 This	 differs	 from	 the	




















Correspondent	 relationships	 (i.e.	 the	 provision	 of	 banking	 services	 by	 a	 correspondent	
institution	 to	 a	 respondent;	 or	 the	 relationship	 between	 credit	 institutions	 and	 financial	
institutions77)	 are	 regarded	 as	 high	 risk.78	 For	 this	 reason,	 financial	 and	 credit	 institutions	
engaged	 in	 cross-border	 correspondent	 relationships	 with	 a	 third	 country	 respondent	
institution	 must	 conduct	 enhanced	 due	 diligence.79	 Where	 the	 respondent	 is	 based	 in	


















As	was	 the	 case	under	 3AMLD,	 politically	 exposed	persons	 (PEPs)	 are	 viewed	as	 posing	 a	
heightened	risk	of	financial	criminality	or	corruption,	and	so	AML	regulations	impose	more	
onerous	 obligations	 on	 them.	 PEPs	 are	 those	 with	 a	 prominent	 public	 function,	 such	 as	
heads	 of	 State,	 ministers,	 members	 of	 parliament,	 members	 of	 the	 governing	 bodies	 of	
political	 parties;	members	 of	 supreme	 courts,	 courts	 of	 auditors	 or	 the	 boards	 of	 central	
banks;	 ambassadors,	 high-ranking	 officers	 in	 the	 armed	 forces,	 members	 of	 the	
administrative,	management	 or	 supervisory	 bodies	 of	 State-owned	 enterprises;	 directors,	




by	 noting	 that	 lower	 ranking	 public	 servants	 are	 less	 well	 paid	 and	 this	may	 affect	 their	
motivations.	Of	course,	a	critical	consequence	of	such	a	line	of	argument	is	extension	of	the	




place	 in	 the	 EU	 since	 2005	 requiring	 “enhanced	 due	 diligence”	 and	 enhanced	 ongoing	
monitoring	when	dealing	with	them,	their	family	members	or	close	associates.	While	these	
duties	 once	 applied	 to	 international	 PEPs	 only,	 4AMLD	 extends	 these	 obligations	 to	
domestic	PEPs,	that	is,	a	politically	exposed	person	who	is	or	who	has	been	entrusted	with	
prominent	 public	 functions	 by	 any	 Member	 State	 or	 by	 an	 institution	 of	 the	 European	





fair.	Moreover,	 the	multinational	nature	of	many	 institutions	as	well	 as	 clients/customers	
means	 that	distinguishing	between	domestic	 and	non-domestic	 PEPs	 is	 not	practicable	or	
useful.	 Then	 again,	 this	 is	 still	 further	 evidence	 of	 the	 creeping	 expansion	 of	 AML.	 To	
mitigate	 this	 development,	 HM	 Treasury	 advocates	 a	 moderate	 approach	 in	 terms	 of	
application,	citing	the	UK’s	position	as	a	world	leader	in	the	fight	against	corruption,	money	
laundering	and	terrorist	financing,	 its	strong	and	stable	democratic	 institutions,	free	press,	
independent	 judiciary	 and	 free	 and	 fair	 elections,	 indicating	 that	 “PEPs	 entrusted	 with	
prominent	public	functions	by	the	UK	should	generally	be	treated	as	lower-risk”.84	
	
The	 level	 of	 risk	 posed	 by	 PEPs	 varies	 substantially	 from	 case	 to	 case,	 and	 so	 a	 uniform	
approach	is	not	appropriate	nor	required.	There	is	no	automatic	refusal	of	banking	or	other	
services	on	the	basis	 that	a	person	 is	a	PEP	or	a	 family	member	of	associate.	As	 the	FATF	















Difficulties	 arise	 because	 of	 the	 imposition	 of	 onerous	 reporting	 and	 monitoring	
requirements	 on	 the	 private	 sector,	 and	 nothing	 in	 the	 2017	 Regulations	 addresses	 this	
adequately.	One	obvious	“workaround”,	to	minimise	compliance	cost	and	effort,	is	through	
the	 process	 of	what	 is	 called	 “de-risking”	whereby	 entities	 terminate	 or	 restrict	 business	
relationships	 with	 categories	 of	 clients	 to	 avoid,	 rather	 than	 manage,	 risk.86	 This	 is	
something	of	a	misnomer,	as	this	is	risk	avoidance,	essentially.	Though	understandable	from	
a	business	perspective,	this	runs	counter	to	the	aim	and	purpose	of	the	risk-based	approach	
advocated	 by	 the	 FATF	 and	 embedded	 across	 the	 EU.	 Undeniably,	 these	 are	 commercial	
decisions	 based	 on	 the	 “risk	 appetite”	 of	 banks,	 and	 so	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 regulatory	
intervention	 is	 feasible	or	desirable	 is	open	 to	discussion.	Nonetheless,	de-risking	 impacts	
on	particular	sectors,	countries	and	people	particularly,87	such	as	money	service	businesses,	
and	 correspondent	 banks,	 PEPs	 and	 migrant	 populations	 seeking	 to	 send	 remittance	
payments.			
	
For	 instance,	 in	2013,	Barclays	 terminated	 the	accounts	of	over	140	UK-based	 remittance	
companies,	 including	Dahabshiil	 Transfer	 Services	 Ltd,	 the	 largest	African	Money	 Transfer	
Operator.	 Dahabshiil	 successfully	 sought	 an	 interim	 injunction,	 based	 on	 the	 claim	 that	






the	 Financial	 Services	 and	 Markets	 Act	 2000	 (as	 inserted	 by	 section	 30	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	 and	 Financial	 Services	 Act	 2016),	which	 requires	 the	 Financial	 Conduct	 Authority	
(FCA)	 to	 produce	 guidance	 to	 ensure	 a	 “proportional,	 risk-based	 and	 differentiated	



















issue	 such	 guidance.	 	 The	 FCA’s	 Guidance,	 issued	 in	 July	 2017,	 states	 that	 a	 PEP	 who	 is	
entrusted	with	a	prominent	public	function	in	the	UK	should	be	treated	as	low	risk,	unless	a	
firm	has	assessed	that	other	risk	factors	not	linked	to	their	position	as	a	PEP	mean	they	pose	
a	 higher	 risk.90	 Furthermore,	 the	 Financial	 Ombudsman	 Service	 (FOS)	 can	 consider	





dealing	 with	 higher	 risk	 customers	 and	 products,	 and	 found	 that	 a	 third	 of	 these	 would	
assume	 very	 high	 levels	 of	 money	 laundering	 risk	 if	 the	 immediate	 reputational	 and	
regulatory	 risk	 was	 acceptable.92 They	 were	 unwilling	 to	 refuse	 or	 exit	 very	 profitable	










imperatives,	 an	 inevitability	 when	 the	 “police”	 are	 profit-making	 entities.	 The	 FCA	 found	
banks’	 compliance	with	 the	2007	 regulations	 to	be	patchy,	 and	 in	 some	 instances	poor;94	




detect	 and	 prevent	 all	 money	 laundering,	 this	 approach	 balances	 the	 cost	 burden	 on	
individual	 firms	and	 customers	with	a	 realistic	 assessment	of	 the	 threat	of	 the	 firm	being	
used	 in	connection	with	money	 laundering.96	Though	 the	objectives	behind	 this	gradation	
























to	 4AMLD	 and	 the	 2017	 Regulations	 is	 transparency.	 In	 a	 radical	 and	 noteworthy	
development,	4AMLD	requires	“beneficial	ownership”	registers	to	be	established	for	certain	
corporates	and	trusts.	Transparency	is	to	the	fore	increasingly	in	the	global	political	setting,	
and	 there	 is	 growing	 focus	 on	 the	 misuse	 of	 different	 legal	 entities	 and	 their	 ability	 to	
conceal	the	identity	of	the	ultimate,	potentially	criminal,	beneficiaries	of	property.98	These	
concerns	 were	 given	 added	 impetus	 by	 the	 revelations	 in	 the	 “Panama	 papers”	 in	 April	
2016,	 followed	 closely	 by	 the	 commitments	 about	 the	 disclosure	 of	 beneficial	 ownership	
made	 at	 the	 Anti-Corruption	 Summit	 in	 London,	 May	 2016.99	 This	 view	 is	 shared	 in	 an	
operational	 sense	 domestically,	 with	 the	 National	 Crime	 Agency	 stating	 that	 “high	 end	
money	 laundering”	 relies	 on	 structures	 set	 up	 specifically	 with	 obscured	 beneficial	
ownership,	in	order	to	hide	the	nature	and	ownership	of	the	funds.100		
	
The	crux	of	the	 issue	here	 is	the	 inherent	capacity	of	different	 legal	structures	to	hide	the	
true	 or	 ultimate	 “beneficial	 owner”	 of	 property	 that	 is	 implicated	 in	 or	 the	 proceeds	 of	
criminality.	 The	 term	 “beneficial	 owner”	 now	 is	 deployed	 more	 broadly	 than	 its	 original	
usage	in	trust	law,	to	denote	the	person	who	will	benefit	from	or	can	use	particular	assets.	
Though	 issues	 of	 definition	 and	 scope	 of	 “beneficial	 owner”	 arise,101	 4AMLD	 describes	
“beneficial	owner”	as	“the	natural	person(s)	who	ultimately	owns	or	controls	the	customer	
and/or	the	natural	person	on	whose	behalf	a	transaction	or	activity	is	being	conducted”,	or	
as	 the	 natural	 person(s)	 who	 ultimately	 owns	 or	 controls	 25%	 of	 legal	 entity,	 or	 the	
beneficiary	of	 25%	or	more	of	 the	property	of	 a	 legal	 arrangement	or	entity.102	 “5AMLD”	

























Though	 the	 trend	 towards	 greater	 transparency	was	 already	manifest	 in	 the	UK	with	 the	
introduction	of	 the	“register	of	people	with	significant	control”	 in	2015,	 the	EU	provisions	
are	broader	 in	 application	and	 scope.	Article	30	of	 4AMLD	 requires	 EU	member	 states	 to	
hold	adequate,	accurate	and	current	information	on	the	beneficial	ownership	of	corporate	
and	other	legal	entities	incorporated	within	their	territory	in	a	central	register	and	provides	





4AMLD	 provides	 for	 an	 exemption	 from	 access	 to	 all	 or	 part	 of	 the	 information	 on	 the	
beneficial	 ownership	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis	 in	 exceptional	 circumstances,	 where	 such	




As	 noted,	 an	 equivalent	 scheme	 has	 already	 been	 introduced	 in	 the	UK	 by	means	 of	 the	
register	 of	 people	 with	 significant	 control	 (“PSC	 register”)	 through	 the	 Small	 Business,	
Enterprise	and	Employment	Act	2015.	Under	section	81	as	enacted,	UK	companies,	limited	
liability	 partnerships	 and	 societates	 europaeae	must	maintain	 a	 PSC	 register	 and	 provide	










by	up	 to	 two	years	 imprisonment.106	The	majority	of	companies	and	LLPs	need	 to	comply	
with	 the	 provisions	 or	 risk	 being	 convicted	 of	 a	 criminal	 offence	 (listed	 companies	 are	
















requirement	 for	 information	 to	 be	 “current”,	 and	 so	 a	 requirement	 to	 notify	 changes	 in	
beneficial	 ownership	within	 a	 shorter	 time	 frame	was	 introduced,	 under	 the	 Information	
about	People	with	Significant	Control	(Amendment)	Regulations	2017.	Entities	must	record	







Similarly,	 Article	 31	 of	 4AMLD	 requires	 the	 trustees	 of	 any	 express	 trust	 with	 tax	
consequences110	 to	hold	adequate,	 accurate	and	up-to-date	 information	on	 the	beneficial	
ownership	 of	 the	 trust.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 companies’	 beneficial	 owner	
register,	the	information	is	not	publically	available	but	can	be	accessed	by	law	enforcement	
and	 the	 UK	 Financial	 Intelligence	 Unit	 (UKFIU).111	 HMRC	 plans	 to	 launch	 its	 register	 in	
summer	2017	as	an	online	service.112		
	
Trusts	 have	major	 advantages	 over	 other	 structures	 in	 terms	 of	 profit	 maximisation	 and	
capital	mobility.113	 The	 perception	 is	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 legitimate	 personal	 and	 financial	
planning	 purposes,	 trusts	 can	 be	 employed	 for	 illicit	 ends,	 due	 to	 their	 autonomous	 and	
relatively	unregulated	nature,	 and	 their	 ability	and	purpose	 to	 conceal	 the	 identity	of	 the	
beneficiaries.114		That	said,	empirical	evidence	is	lacking	as	to	their	use	in	money	laundering,	
though	 this	 may	 be	 an	 inevitable	 consequence	 of	 their	 secretive	 nature.	 A	 World	 Bank	
review	of	150	grand	corruption	 investigations	 found	that	trusts	were	used	 infrequently,115	
comprising	five	percent	of	the	corporate	vehicles	identified	and	appearing	in	c.15	percent	of	
the	investigations,	mostly	in	Latin	America,	the	Caribbean,	and	high-income	nations.	These	
findings	 may	 challenge	 widespread	 presumption	 about	 misuse	 of	 trusts.	 It	 is	 unclear	
whether	 this	 pattern	 would	 be	 replicated	 in	 the	 UK,	 and	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 connection	
between	 the	scale	of	 the	corruption	and	 the	 trust	used.	 	Moreover,	one	must	be	mindful	
that	 the	 cases	 explored	 in	 the	 World	 Bank	 review	 may	 not	 be	 representative,	 as	 they	




















While	 the	 sentiment	 behind	 these	 beneficial	 ownership	 initiatives	 is	 understandable,	 I	
suggest	 that	 both	 in	 doctrine	 and	 implementation	 they	 are	 questionable.	 The	 threshold,	
whether	of	25%	or	10%,	is	arbitrary	and	can	be	circumvented.	When	AMLD3	was	agreed,	a	
25%	baseline	was	deemed	to	be	sufficient,	following	the	example	in	the	FATF	Guidance	on	
Transparency	 and	 Beneficial	 Ownership	 (which,	 however,	 was	 careful	 to	 note	 that	 its	

























There	 is	 political	 unanimity	 as	 to	 the	 need	 to	 address	 money	 laundering	 robustly,	 in	
preventive	 and	 reactive	 modes.	 As	 Halliday	 et	 al.	 note,	 the	 orthodoxy	 is	 that	 the	
implementation	 of	 an	 effective	 AML	 regime	 delivers	 only	 public	 and	 private	 goods	 and	
















First,	 there	was	 limited	empirical	evidence	of	 the	effectiveness	of	 the	previous	scheme,122	
undermining	 any	 claims	 that	 its	 extension	 through	 4MLD	 and	 the	 MLR	 2017	 would	 be	




suppressing	 crimes”.123	 While	 they	 note	 that	 the	 regime	 eases	 the	 investigation	 and	
prosecution	of	some	criminal	participants	who	would	otherwise	evade	justice,	this	is	fewer	









instructive	 to	consider	 the	 jurisprudence	of	 the	French	courts	 considering	 the	public	 trust	







the	 settlor,	beneficiary	and	administrator	of	a	 trust	which	provides	 information	on	how	a	
person	 intends	 to	 dispose	 of	 his	 or	 her	 estate	 is	 a	 “manifestly	 disproportionate”	
encroachment	 on	 the	 right	 to	 respect	 for	 private	 life.127	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	 relevant	
paragraph	 of	 the	 Tax	 Code	 being	 declared	 unconstitutional.128	 It	 appears	 that	 the	
determination	 hinged	 on	 the	 “public”	 aspect	 of	 the	 register	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 the	
information.	Nonetheless,	this	decision	underlines	the	contentious	nature	of	such	measures,	
and	 suggests	 potential	 challenges	 on	 human	 rights	 grounds	 to	 the	 EU’s	 requirement	 of	
public	registers	of	trusts.	All	that	said,	it	is	unlikely	that	any	comparable	challenge	could	be	




this	 is	 likely	 to	be	 incompatible	with	EU	data	protection	 laws.	 Indeed,	 the	European	Data	











introduce	 policy	 purposes	 other	 than	 countering	 anti-money	 laundering	 and	 terrorism	
financing	that	do	not	seem	clearly	identified	and	so	breach	the	data	protection	principle	of	
purpose	 limitation.129	 The	 EDPS	 also	 states	 that	 the	 amendments	 are	 disproportionate	 in	






the	 risk-based	 approach	 has	 prompted	 a	 backlash	 which	 impacts	 detrimentally	 on	 the	
provision	 of	 services	 to	 certain	 communities,	 individuals,	 and	 sectors.	 Furthermore,	 as	
Halliday	et	al.	remind	us,	AML	is	open	to	misuse	by	authoritarian	rulers.130	Moreover,	AML	
overlooks	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 the	 human	 dimension	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 like	 any	scheme	
of	regulation,	 it	 can	 be	 circumvented	 by	insiders.	 It	 is	 easiest	 to	 launder	money	with	 the	






Peter	 Alldridge	 described	 AML	 as	 strongly	 expansionist	 in	 three	 important	 respects:	
geographically,	 by	 area	 of	 the	 economy,	 and	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 legal	 impediments	 to	
effective	 regulation.132	Though	4AMLD	purports	 to	be	more	nuanced	and	ostensibly	more	
sensitive	to	risk	and	new	technologies,	it	maintains	the	growth	of	AML	for	dubious	purposes	
and	unsustainable	 reasons,	and	 this	will	 continue	with	 the	changes	mooted	 in	5AMLD.	As	









books”	 translates	 into	 the	 compromising	 of	 financial	 flows	 “in	 action”.134	 McBarnet	
identified	a	paradox	in	the	law,	in	relation	to	the	gap	between	its	principle	and	practice:	she	
argued	that	the	gap	exists	within	the	law	and	legal	authority	itself,	rather	than	arising	as	a	













internally	 inconsistent,	and	fails	to	 incorporate	 its	own	aims	and	principles.	The	risk-based	
approach	 pays	 lip	 service	 to	 the	 aims	 of	 crime	 control,	 while	 simultaneously	 creating	
exceptions	 and	 undermining	 its	 own	 substance.	 And	 the	 crux	 of	 this	 problem	 and	 of	 its	
resolution	 lies	 in	 the	pivotal	 role	of	 the	private	 sector,	 in	 the	divesting	of	duties	 to	 those	
very	institutions	that	are	both	responsible	for	and	subject	to	the	Regulations.							
	
		
	
	
